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Articles 
THE USE OF JUROR TESTIMONY TO IMPEACH A JURY VERDICT: 
THE MARYLAND PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL SOLUTION 
by Sean Patrick Casey 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 1 
independent truckers sued a trucking company ("Blue 
Ridge") claiming that Blue Ridge breached a contract 
by unfairly assigning favorable trucking routes to Blue 
Ridge employees. On the morning of trial, courthouse 
security guards mistakenly directed a non-juror to the 
jury room. The non-juror sat with the jury during the 
first day of trial, listening to the opening statements 
and the plaintiffs' first witness. The regular jurors 
believed the non-juror was a member of the panel. 
The error was not spotted initially, because thirteen 
jurors had been selected, and the court had excused 
one of the thirteen before triaL2 After the first day, the 
judge discovered the error and discharged the non-
juror from further service.3 After a twelve day trial, 
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs.4 
The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, 
alleging the non-juror prejudiced the verdict. In 
support of the motion, the defendant offered an 
affidavit of a regular juror.s In the affidavit, the juror 
stated that during a recess the non-juror told the entire 
jury that he was familiar with the trucking business 
and knew trucking companies were unfair to truckers.6 
The non-juror added that regardless of Blue Ridge's 
defense, he would vote against the company. 7 
Included in the affidavits was the fact that a female 
juror said, "she was glad this gentleman was on the 
I 802 F.2d 1532 (4th Cir. 1986). 
2 See id. at 1534. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
S See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
jury because he would be a great help."8 The only 
evidence of the non-juror's statements was the 
affidavit.9 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit ruled that the trial court correctly 
admitted the juror's affidavit under Rule 606(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 1o Presuming the non-
juror's comments influenced the jury, the court 
granted Blue Ridge's motion. lI 
If Haley were decided under Maryland law, the 
court's analysis and final ruling would have been quite 
different. A Maryland court would deem the affidavit 
inadmissible under Md. Rule 5-606(b)12 and 
accompanying case law, because it came directly from 
a juror. 13 The court could only review evidence not 
emanating from the jury to determine whether the 
non-juror's comments affected the verdict. 14 Under 
Md. Rule 5-606, the admissible evidence in Haley was 
8 See id. 
9 See id. at 1535. In Haley, the transcript from the evidentiary 
hearing was lost. The court did not address the issue of whether 
the non-juror was available to testify at the hearing. ld. 
10 FED. R. EVID. 606(b). Rule 606 permits juror testimony 
"whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence 
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror." ld. 
II See infra notes 91-106. 
12 Md. R. 5-606(b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict 
(l )Inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror may not testify as 
to (A) any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations, (B) the effect of anything upon that or any 
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent 
or dissent from the verdict, or (C) the juror's mental processes in 
connection with the verdict. 
(2)A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror 
concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded 
from testifying may not be received for these purposes. 
13 See infra note 53. 
14 See Harford Sands, Inc. v. Groft, 320 Md. 136, 145, 577 A.2d 
7,11(1990). 
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 17 
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that an individual sat with the jury for one day of a 
twelve day trial. I5 
Viewing this evidence under Maryland's 
"probability of prejudice" test,16 the court would likely 
deny Blue Ridge's motion for a new trial. The 
available evidence would not suggest that the non-
juror held a strong bias against trucking companies, 
nor would the court have considered the female juror's 
favorable impression of the non-juror's presence. 17 
The possibility existed for the non-juror's mere 
presence to have influenced the verdict, but it would 
be unreasonable to conclude that the non-juror 
probably prejudiced the verdict. 18 
In many situations, Maryland's strict rule that a 
juror will not be heard to impeach his or her own 
verdict, denies litigants a verdict based "solely on 
evidence presented" at trial. 19 Improper third party 
15 The non-juror would be permitted to testify under Md. Rule 5-
606, but the Haley court did not address the issue of the non-
juror's testimony. 
16 See Wernsing v. General Motors, Co., 298 Md. 406, 419-20, 
470 A.2d 802,809 (1984). 
Where . . . the precise extraneous matter is 
known but direct evidence as to its effect on 
the deliberations is not permitted, a sound 
balance is struck by a rule which looks to the 
probability of prejudice from the face of the 
extraneous matter in relation to the 
circumstances of the particular case. It is the 
function of the trial judge when ruling on a 
motion for a new trial to evaluate the degree of 
probable prejudice and whether it justifies a 
new trial. Id. (emphasis added). 
17 See Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 70, 102 A.2d 714, 721 
(1954). 
In Maryland there has been no deviation from 
the rule that what takes place in the jury-room 
ought to be ... known only to the jurors 
themselves and their testimony cannot be 
heard to impeach their verdict, whether the 
conduct objected to be misbehavior or 
mistake. !d. 
18 See Wernsing, 298 Md. at 419,470 A.2d at 808. 
19 See James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner 
v. United States and Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 389, 393 
(1991). 
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 18 
contact,2° dictionaries,21 media coverage,22 and a 
myriad of other extrinsic forces have tainted jury 
verdicts. If a competent source of evidence exposing 
these improprieties cannot be found, a reviewing court 
will affirm a corrupted verdict. 
The primary issue in verdict impeachment cases 
is what evidence a court may consider in determining 
the degree of prejudice that was placed on the 
deliberations of the jury. The purpose of this article is 
to explain the Maryland and federal approaches to this 
issue and offer an equitable alternative to Maryland's 
strict rule. The article commences with an 
examination of the historical background and policy 
considerations for denying admissibility of jury 
testimony for verdict impeachment purposes. Next, it 
discusses the Maryland and federal approaches to this 
issue. The article closes by proposing that the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland abandon its hard line doctrine 
in favor of a balanced rule. The proposed rule 
combines elements of Federal Rule 606(b) with a 
variation of the local rule of the United States District 
Court for the Distr"ict of Maryland that generally 
prohibits attorneys from contacting discharged 
jurors.23 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The tenet that a juror will not be heard to 
impeach his or her own verdict has its roots in 
eighteenth century England. In Vaise v. Delaval,24 a 
party offered juror affidavits to prove that after 
reaching an impasse, the jury flipped a coin to 
determine the verdict of the suit.25 Articulating what 
has become known as Lord Mansfield's Rule, the 
court refused to consider the affidavits. Writing for 
the court, Lord Mansfield stated: 
20 See Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321, 125 A. 782 
(1924). 
21 See Wernsing, 298 Md. at 419,470 A.2d at 809. 
22 See United States v. Rocks, 339 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
23 See U.S. DIST. CT. MD. R. 107.16. 
24 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). 
25 See id. 
The Court cannot receive such an affidavit 
from any of the jurymen themselves, in all 
of whom such conduct is a very high 
misdemeanor, but in every such case the 
Court must derive their knowledge from 
some other source: such as from some 
person having seen the transaction through 
a window, or by some other means. 26 
American courts have since used Lord Mansfield's 
Rule as the foundation for limiting post-verdict juror 
testimony.27 
Justifications for restricting juror testimony can 
generally be divided into three groups: protection of 
the jury, maintaining finality in litigation, and 
preserving the jury as the democratic element of the 
legal system. 
A. Protection of the Jury 
The first group of arguments advanced for not 
accepting juror testimony is centered on the policy 
goal of preventing post-verdict harassment of the jury. 
Courts have consistently held that allowing jurors to 
speak on their verdicts would create another way for 
a losing party to pursue its cause.28 Compared to the 
appellate process, the potential for uncovering a flaw 
in the jury's deliberation is an expedient and cost 
effective alternative. In McDonald v. Pless,29 the 
United States Supreme Court warned that if one 
verdict was successfully challenged using the 
testimony of a juror, the door would open to endless 
harassment of jurors and change the private process 
into a public investigation. 30 
26 [d. 
27 See Peter N. Thompson, Challenge to the Decision Making 
Process-Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and the 
Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 Sw. LJ. 1187, 1197 
(1985). 
28 See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Aron v. 
Brock, 118 Md. App. 475, 703 A.2d 208 (1997). 
29 238 U.S. 264 (1915). 
30 See id. at 267. 
[L]et it once be established that verdicts 
solemnly made and publicly returned into 
court can be attacked and set aside on the 
Articles 
The danger is not limited to interrogations by 
defeated litigants. Once a court receives testimony 
from the defeated party, the prevailing party will be 
compelled to gather testimony in support of the 
verdict.3! Conflicting testimony will be offered, and 
a race to credible jurors will ensue.32 In order to 
discourage post-verdict investigations, courts have 
deemed the fruit of these inquires inadmissible.33 
Under a similar analysis, courts have argued that. 
barring the introduction of jury testimony decreases 
the potential for jury tampering.34 There will always 
be an opportunity to bribe or threaten a member of the 
jury during trial, but allowing jurors to testify after the 
verdict will afford the corrupt litigant another occasion 
to sway the verdict. 
It can be safely stated that virtually all litigants 
enter trial with some hope of victory. Presumably, 
litigants without hope will settle their cases or accept 
pleas of guilty. In many cases defeat does not become 
a reality until a court has rendered a verdict.35 By 
negating the effect of juror testimony, the motive to 
tamper with a jury is eliminated at the time many 
desperate litigants would first consider that extreme 
measure. 
testimony of those who took part in their 
publication and all verdicts could be, and 
many would be, followed by an inquiry in the 
hope of discovering something which might 
invalidate the finding. Jurors would be 
harassed and beset by the defeated party in an 
effort to secure from them evidence of facts 
which might establish misconduct sufficient to 
set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured 
could be thus used, the result would be to 
make what was intended to be a private 
deliberation, the constant subject of public 
investigation; to the destruction of all 
frankness and freedom of discussion and 
conference. [d. 
31 See generally Diehm, supra note 19, at 397. 
32 See id. at 397. 
33 See id. at 395. 
34 See supra note 30. 
3S See Diehm, supra note 19, at 396. 
29.1 U. Balt. L. F. 19 
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B. Maintaining Confidentiality in the Jury Room 
Another policy consideration offered is the 
potential constraint that would be placed on debate 
and expression in the jury room if the deliberations 
were made public. Our jury system operates 
effectively only when jurors are free to express their 
thoughts and opinions without the thought of societal 
retaliation.36 The single goal of deliberation is to 
arrive at a fair, well-reasoned verdict. If statements 
made in the privacy of deliberation could be made 
public, additional agenda would develop. Instead of 
open communications based on the merits of a claim, 
jurors might decide cases based on the popularity of a 
verdict.37 
C. Finality of Jury Verdicts 
An additional argument is based on the need for 
finality of jury verdicts. The finality argument is 
founded on the premise that the jury system is 
imperfect,38 but litigation must end at some point. By 
prohibiting jurors from impeaching their verdicts, 
legislatures and courts have deemed the announcement 
of the verdict as the final cutoff. The choice to bring 
closure to litigation is important both for the parties 
and society as a whole.39 If courts were to receive 
testimony every time a juror made a mistake, many 
cases would be retried.40 Confidence and trust in the 
legal system would be shaken if constant 
36 See id at 399. 
37 See id. at 400. 
38 See Jorgensen v. Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 
1947). In Jorgensen, the court rationalized that attainment of 
perfection is an impossible task, stating: 
[I]t would be impracticable to impose the 
counsel of absolute perfection that no 
verdict shall stand, unless every juror has 
been entirely without bias, and has based 
his vote only upon evidence he has heard in 
court. It is doubtful whether more than one 
in a hundred would stand such at test .... 
ld (emphasis added). 
39 See Diehm, supra note 19, at 403. 
40 See id 
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 20 
imperfections in the jury system were broadcast to the 
public.41 
A related policy consideration is the reality that 
our legal system moves at a slow pace. The pace is 
further delayed when jurors wait long periods of time 
before revealing a flaw in the process.42 The 
combined result is that many years may pass before a 
case is retried. As time passes, witnesses disappear, 
memories fade, and evidence is 10st.43 It is unlikely 
that the parties will be able to assemble the necessary 
resources to retry the case effectively. The final result 
will be another trial in which the jury renders a verdict 
based on a fragment of the evidence, instead of the full 
merits of the case.44 A refusal to accept juror 
testimony is partially based on the practical reality that 
a fair judgment is less attainable on retrial. 
D. The Democratic Element of the Legal System 
The jury system is based on the concept that 
twelve representatives of the community will decide 
the merits of the case. In the criminal context, jurors 
are considered the peers of the accused. The jury, as 
a representative of the community, has "the power to 
decide what values will control the verdict."45 This 
power is constant, even when the jury's values are 
different from those of the court or the legislature.46 
41 See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. lO7, 121 (1987). 
Justice O'Connor writing for the Court stated, "[T]he 
community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions oflay 
people would be undermined by a barrage of post-verdict 
scrutiny of juror conduct." ld 
42 See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 
1073, lO75-76 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining that juror waited 
twenty months after announcement ofthe verdict before coming 
forward to reveal that a hearing impairment prevented him from 
understanding the evidence offered in the case). 
43 See Diehm, supra note 19, at 402. 
44 See id at 403. 
45 See Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify That a Verdict 
Was the Product of Racial Bias, 9 ST. JOHN'S 1. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 125, 135 (1993). 
46 See United States v. Powell, 936 F.2d lO56, lO62 (9th Cir. 
1991) ("The concept of jury nullification allows the jury to 
acquit the defendant even when the government has proven its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
The practice of permitting the jury to testify about the 
deliberation process would provide the government an 
opportunity to witness and control the jury's decision-
making. Independence of thought, whether grounded 
in accepted legal theory or the will of the community, 
is essential to maintaining the autonomous role of the 
jury in our legal system.47 
The focus of the paper will now tum to an 
analysis of how the above policy considerations have 
been incorporated into the strict Maryland rule 
forbidding juror testimony to challenge a verdict. 
III. MARYLAND LAW 
Maryland Rule 5-606(b) is the rule of evidence 
that addresses the competency of a juror as a witness.48 
The rule is the result of a balancing test in which the 
rights of a litigant to a fair and accurate verdict are 
weighed against the policy considerations advanced 
for excluding juror testimony.49 By adopting Rule 5-
606(b), a hard-line stance against receiving juror 
testimony to impeach a verdict, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland has essentially determined that the right 
of a litigant to a fair trial is subordinate to protecting 
the jury and the deliberation process. 
A. Broad Application of Lord Mansfield's Rule 
The first clear application of Lord Mansfield's 
Rule in Maryland occurred in 1864. In Browne v. 
Browne,5o the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused 
to consider juror testimony alleging that a compromise 
was reached so a sick juror could return home. Since 
Browne, Maryland courts have broadly applied a 
general bar excluding juror testimony, regardless of 
whether the offered testimony alleged a mistake made 
47 See United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 
1979). Without a restriction on juror testimony, "the result 
would be that every jury verdict would either become the court's 
verdict or would be permitted to stand only by the court's leave." 
ld. 
48 See supra note 12. 
49 See id. 
5U 22 Md. 103 (1864). 
Articles 
during the deliberations or unlawful conduct affecting 
the jury.51 Additionally, courts do not distinguish 
between civil and criminal cases. 52 
The policy reasons underlying the general rule 
are cited as consistently as the rule is applied. 53 
Courts have held that permitting juror testimony 
would encourage jury tampering and harassment, 
make private deliberations the subject of public 
concern, and remove finality and stability from jury 
verdicts.54 In Maryland, there has been close 
compliance with the rule against receiving juror 
testimony supported by unwavering policy 
justifications, but a distinction must be made between 
two types of verdict impeachment cases. 
B. Verdict Impeachment Cases 
1. Evidence From the Jury 
Cases in which evidence of improper conduct has 
been presented to courts can be divided into two broad 
classes.55 The first group concerns situations when a 
juror is the only source of evidence. No distinction is 
made between cases where the juror comes forward to 
offer testimony of impropriety or when a third party 
claims to have received evidence from a juror and 
attempts to present it to the court.56 The question is 
whether the original source of the testimony is a 
51 See Williams, 204 Md. at 67-68, 102 A.2d at 719 (citing 
Browne, 22 Md. 103, 113 (1864». Explaining the broad 
application of the rule, the court stated, "[t]he law in Maryland 
is well settled that a juror cannot be heard to impeach his verdict, 
whether the jury conduct objected to be misbehavior or mistake." 
ld. 
52 See id. at 72, 102 A.2d at 722. "[T]here is no sound basis for 
a distinction between civil and criminal cases in this regard." 
53 See e.g., Harford Sands, 320 Md. at 145, 577 A.2d at 11; 
Wemsing, 298 Md. at 411-12, 470 A.2d at 805; Oxtoby v. 
McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 101, 447 A.2d 860, 870 (1982); 
Williams, 204 Md. at 67-72, 102 A.2d at 720-21; Brinsfield v. 
Howeth, 110 Md. 520,530, 73 A. 289, 290 (l909); Dixon v. 
State, 27 Md. App. 443,448,340 A.2d 396, 400 (1975). 
54 See supra note 53. 
55 See Aron, 118 Md. App. at 493, 703 A.2d at 226. 
56 See Zeller v. Mayson, 168 Md. 663, 673, 179 A. 179, 184 
(1935) (non-juror's affidavit excluded as pure hearsay). 
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 21 
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juror. 57 When the only evidence offered can be traced 
directly to a juror, the law is clear. Under Md. Rule 5-
606(b) and cases decided before its enactment, juror 
testimony will not be heard to impeach a verdict. 58 
An example of the application of this law can be 
found in the court of appeals holding in Kelly v. Huber 
Baking Co. 59 In Kelly, a juror's affidavit was offered 
to prove that the brother-in-law of the defense counsel 
approached a juror and told him the plaintiffs 
principle witness was a "crook" and should not be 
believed.60 After acknowledging the seriousness of the 
charge, the court refused to consider the affidavit.61 
The court determined that "under no circumstances 
could the affidavit be considered for the purpose for 
which it was offered."62 
More recently, Maryland appellate courts have 
ruled that trial judges properly denied motions for new 
trials when the only available evidence had been juror 
affidavits alleging the verdict was tainted by racial 
prejudice,63 a friendship with a member of the law firm 
representing a party,64 or the improper consideration of 
the accused's prior criminal record.65 When the only 
evidence directly or indirectly emanates from 
members of the jury, the court must uphold the verdict 
even if it is apparent that a transgression has taken 
place. 
57 In Harford Sands, the court excluded testimony of the 
plaintiffs counsel and a spectator at the trial. The substance of 
the testimony was that a juror had told them he was "the 
strongest member of the jury" and "he was very proud he had 
played [an] important role [in swaying the verdict]." Harford 
Sands, 320 Md. at 143,577 A.2d at 10. 
5S See supra note 12. 
59 145 Md. 321,125 A. 782 (1924). 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. 
63 See Williams, 204 Md. at 72, 102 A.2d at 722. 
64 See Braun v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Md. App. 545, 363 A. 2d 
562 (1976). 
65 See Dixon, 27 Md. App. 443,340 A.2d 396 (1975). 
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 22 
2. Evidence From Other Sources 
The analysis becomes compounded when 
evidence from competent sources is presented to the 
court. In cases where alternative means of proof are 
available, Maryland courts run the evidence through a 
two prong test.66 In the first prong, the court 
determines the admissibility of the proffered evidence. 
Md. Rule 5-606(b) operates as a gatekeeper, excluding 
testimony that flows from the jury. Evidence that is 
deemed admissible under this analysis advances to the 
second prong. Here, under a "probable prejudice"67 
standard, the court reviews the admissible evidence to 
determine if the jury was affected by the alleged 
misbehavior.68 In the second prong there is not a 
bright line rule for making the determination. Instead, 
the court must make its decision based on the 
circumstances of each case.69 
An illustration of this two prong analysis can be 
found in Harford Sands v. Groft.70 In that case, ajuror 
questioned construction workers about the capabilities 
of a concrete pumping machine to repair the damage. 
Later at trial, the plaintiffs expert witness testified 
that the same machine could not repair the damage on 
the plaintiff s property. The expert testimony was 
inconsistent with the information given by the 
construction workers. The jury awarded the limited 
sum of $4,000.00 to the plaintifCl Harford Sands 
filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the juror's 
conversation with the construction workers affected 
the verdict. In support of the motion, it attempted to 
introduce affidavits from the juror, the construction 
workers, and individuals that had spoken with the 
juror after the trial. 72 
66 See Harford Sands, 320 Md. 136, 577 A.2d 7 (1990). 
67 See supra note 16. 
6S See supra note 16. 
69 See Smith v. Pearre, 96 Md. App. 376, 391, 625 A.2d 349, 
349 (1993) Gudgment of the trial judge will not be disturbed but 
for abuse of discretion). 
70 320 Md. 136,577 A.2d 7 (1990). 
71 See id. (In Harford Sands, the plaintiff, was seeking $1.1 
million in damages). 
72 See id. at 136, 577 A.2d at 9. 
Under the first prong of the test, the trial court 
excluded the affidavits of the juror and the individuals 
he had spoken to after trial,73 but accepted the 
affidavits of the construction workers. The 
construction workers' affidavits were admissible 
because they were based on their personal knowledge 
and could not be traced back to the jury room.74 The 
appellate court found that the excluded affidavits 
suffered "the taint of possible post-verdict 
importuning," and were properly excluded.75 
Moving to the second prong, the court considered 
the possible effect the construction workers' 
statements had on the jury's deliberations.76 The court 
took into account that credible evidence was admitted 
to show the plaintiff s damages may have been only 
$4,000.00. Failing to find "probable prejudice" in 
relation to the circumstances of the case, the court 
denied Harford Sands' motion for a new trial. 77 
In a similar case of juror misconduct, Smith v. 
Pearre,78 a trial judge instructed jurors not to watch 
television programs on medical subjects. In defiance 
of these instructions, the jury foreman watched a 60 
Minutes episode on doctors who left the medical 
industry due to their frustration with medical insurance 
companies. After a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the 
defendants discovered the misbehavior and filed a 
motion for a new trial. After applying the two prong 
analysis, the court affirmed the denial of the motion 
for a new triaU9 First, the court admitted juror 
testimony of the fact that the juror watched the 
program because it was extraneous material of an 
occurrence outside ofthe jury room.80 After analyzing 
the second prong, the court concluded, "while it was 
possible that the 60 Minutes segment influenced the 
73 See id. 
74 See Christ v. Wempe, 219 Md. 627, 642,150 A.2d 918,926 
(1959). 
75 Harford Sands, 320 Md. at 138, 577 A.2d at 9 (quoting 
Wemsing, 298 Md. at 413, 470 A.2d at 805). 
76 See id. 
77 See id. at 150, 577 A.2d at 13. 
78 96 Md. App. 376, 625 A.2d 349 (1993). 
79 See id. at 391,625 A.2d at 356. 
80 See id. at 390, 625 A.2d at 355. 
Articles 
jury foreman, we are not convinced that it probably 
resulted in prejudice."81 
C. Criminal Cases 
Criminal cases dealing with the issue of the 
admissibility of juror testimony follow the same 
analysis. In Williams v. State,82 the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland refused to consider an affidavit of a juror 
that explained the verdict was based on racial 
prejudice.83 The court pointed out that "under 
Maryland law the affidavit of a juror is inadmissible, 
. . . and there is no sound basis for a distinction 
between civil and criminal cases in this regard."84 
In Dixon v. State,85 a criminal defendant filed a 
motion for a new trial, claiming his Sixth Amendment 
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him 
had been violated. He alleged that the prosecutor 
privately informed a juror of the defendant's prior rape 
conviction. The defendant offered another juror's 
affidavit to prove that the defendant's prior criminal 
history was relayed to the entire jury.86 Relying on 
Williams v. State and a series of civil cases, the court 
found the affidavit inadmissible and affirmed the 
denial of the motion for a new trial.87 The court did 
not specifically address the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment challenge.88 
81 Id. at 391, 625 A.2d at 356. 
82 204 Md. 55, 102 A.2d 714 (1954). 
83 See id. at 70, 102 A.2d at 722. 
84 Id. 
85 27 Md. App. 443, 340 A.2d 396 (1975). 
86 See id. at 446, 340 A.2d at 398. 
87 See id. 
88 See generally Allen v. State, 89 Md. App. 25, 46-47,597 A.2d 
489, 499-500 (1990). In dicta, the court explained that in 
criminal cases when jury misconduct or improper 
communication is shown, prejudice is presumed and the burden 
shifts to the state to rebut the presumption of harm. See also 
Eades v. State, 75 Md. App. 411, 541 A.2d 1001 (1988). 
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 23 
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IV. FEDERAL LAW 
The federal answer to the question of 
admissibility of juror testimony to challenge a verdict 
is significantly different from Maryland's approach. 
A. Amending Lord Mansfield's Rule 
The first United States Supreme Court case to 
consider whether a juror could be heard to impeach a 
verdict was Mattox v. United States. 89 In Mattox, the 
defendant, after being convicted of murder, presented 
juror affidavits reporting that extraneous matters were 
presented to the jury by a bailiff and through a 
newspaper article.90 By accepting the affidavits, the 
Court carved out an exception to Lord Mansfield's 
Rule. The Court maintained that jury testimony 
regarding motives and influences that affected the 
deliberations were inadmissible, "[b Jut a juryman may 
testify to any facts bearing upon the ... existence of 
any extraneous influence, although not as to how far 
that influence operated on his mind."91 The Court 
relied on precedent from state and federal cases which 
advised that situations may arise where Lord 
Mansfield's Rule should be amended in the interests 
of justice.92 
After Mattox, federal courts varied their approach 
to the issue of juror testimony for impeachment 
purposes. In McDonald v. Pless,93 the Court retreated 
from its previous holding and excluded juror affidavits 
89 146 U.S. 140 (1892). 
90 See id at 142-43. The affidavits alleged that the bailiff told a 
group of jurors that Mattox had killed two other men. 
Additionally, another juror admitted reading an account of the 
trial in the newspaper. The newspaper article detailed an earlier 
murder trial in which Mattox had been found not guilty. Jd. 
91 Id at 149. 
92 See United States v. Reid, 33 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 366 
(1851 )("Cases might arise in which it would be impossible to 
refuse [juror testimony] without violating the plainest principles 
of justice."); Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 20 
Iowa 195 (l866)("Affidavits of jurors may be received for the 
purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring ... 
which does not essentially adhere in the verdict."). 
93 238 U.S. 264 (1915). 
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claiming the jury created a mathematical formula to 
reach a damage award. Relying heavily on Lord 
Mansfield's Rule, the Court refused to consider the 
affidavits.94 The Court clarified that Mattox was an 
exception to the general rule against receiving juror 
testimony.95 The exception was limited to 
circumstances where the basic principles of justice 
would be violated without the juror testimony. The 
Court determined the facts were insufficient to warrant 
admission of jury testimony. 
By the early 1970's, the federal approach had 
stabilized in two respects. First, federal courts 
excluded all juror testimony in regard to the reasoning 
process employed during deliberations. Second, 
evidence concerning misconduct by third parties or 
other extraneous sources influencing the verdict was 
generally received.96 With these policies in mind, the 
Federal Rules Advisory Committee drafted Rule 
606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.97 
B. Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
In 1974 Congress enacted Federal Rule 606(b).98 
94 See id at 268-69. 
95 See id 
96 See Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusion Principle of 
Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C.L. REV. 509, 520 (1988). 
97 See id 
98 FED. R. EVID. 606(b). Rule 606(b) provides: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict 
or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any 
matter or statement occurring during the 
course of the jury's deliberations or to the 
effect of anything upon that or any other 
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the 
jurors to assent or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning the juror's mental 
processes in connection therewith, except that 
a juror may testify on the question whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or 
whether any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor mayan 
affidavit or evidence of any statement by the 
juror concerning a matter about which the 
juror would be precluded from testifying be 
Incorporating language from Mattox, the rule permits 
testimony as to whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was brought to the jury's attention or 
whether any outside influence was placed on a j uror. 99 
Rule 606(b) maintained the general bar against 
receiving testimony on jurors' thought processes in 
connection with the verdict. Congress attached an 
Advisory Committee Note to help lower courts 
interpret the new statute. 100 
Federal courts apply Rule 606(b) in the same 
manner that Maryland courts employ Rule 5-606(b ).101 
The rule operates as a gatekeeper for evidence 
originating inside the jury room. Examples of juror 
testimony received under Rule 606(b) include bribery 
attempts,102 knowledge acquired from media 
sources, 103 and unauthorized viewing of accident 
sites. 104 
An example of the federal approach to the 
admissibility of juror testimony is found in United 
States v. Tanner. 105 After receiving convictions for 
conspiracy to defraud the United States and mail 
fraud, the defendants filed a motion for a new trial. In 
support oftheir motion, they sought to introduce juror 
affidavits alleging that the jury engaged in substantial 
drug and alcohol abuse during the trial. The United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the affidavits were 
inadmissible under Rule 606(b) and affirmed the 
convictions. Drawing a distinction between internal 
received for these purposes. 
99 See id. 
100 See Crump, supra note 96 (citing Rules of Evidence for 
United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.D.R. 183, 266 
advisory committee's note, subdivision (b) (1973)). Rather than 
defining the exceptions to the general rule, the note explained 
conduct which would not fit into the exceptions. The note 
suggested that compromise verdicts, quotient verdicts, and 
misunderstanding of jury instructions were not extraneous 
prejudicial information. Verdicts decided by lot or chance were 
not improper outside influences. Id 
101 See supra note 97. 
102 See Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977). 
103 See United States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Pa. 
1976). 
104 See United States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1982). 
105 483 U. S. 107 (1987). 
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and external influences, the Court held that juror 
testimony on juror incompetence issues was internal 
in nature and therefore barred by Rule 606(b ).106 The 
Court indicated that juror testimony may be 
admissible in cases of substantial incompetence, but 
held that the defendants' claim fell short of the 
standard. 107 
When evidence is offered alleging juror 
impropriety, like their Maryland counterparts, federal 
courts apply a similar two prong analysis. lo8 A major 
difference between the jurisdictional approaches is the 
standard of prejudice required for a new trial. In the 
federal context, if the court finds admissible evidence 
of extraneous juror contact, it invokes a presumption 
of prejudice. 109 The burden shifts to the party seeking 
to sustain the verdict to prove there was not a 
"reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was 
influenced by an improper communication. "110 
Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., III 
illustrates the federal approach. In Stephens, 
documents previously entered into evidence were 
supplemented with extraneous information damaging 
to the defendant. On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first determined that 
juror affidavits revealing the existence of extraneous 
information were properly received under Rule 
606(b). The court then held that the juror testimony 
mandated a presumption of prejudice because the 
extraneous material was more than "innocuous."112 
Finally, the court ruled that the plaintiff did not offer 
rebuttal evidence or an explanation to show a lack of 
a reasonable possibility of prejudice on the jury.113 
106 See id. at 118. 
107 See id. at 125. 
108 See supra note 98. 
109 See, e.g., Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 
1537 (4th Cir. 1986); Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., 
848 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 1988). 
110 See Haley, 802 F.2d at 1537 (citing United State v. Barnes, 
747 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
III 848 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1988). 
112 Id. at 487. 
113 See id. at 489. The court stated that a new trial "is justified 
when the verdict is so obviously rendered suspect because the 
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The presumption applied in federal cases similar 
to Stephens is justified because Rule 606(b) prevents 
an inquiry into the actual effect the extraneous 
material had on the jurors' minds. Without the 
presumption, the moving party would face the 
daunting task of proving prejudice, lacking any 
reasonable means to produce competent evidence. 
C. Sixth Amendment Challenges 
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution 
guarantees the criminal defendant the right to be 
confronted with witnesses against him or her. 114 When 
the jury receives evidence from an outside source and 
not through trial, this fundamental constitutional right 
is denied to the accused. I 15 The "extraneous 
prejudicial information" exception in Rule 606(b) 
addresses this constitutional concern. I 16 By admitting 
juror testimony on the question of whether extraneous 
prejudicial information improperly reached the jury, a 
federal court may fairly evaluate if the defendant was 
denied a fair trial. I 17 
D. Local Rule Safeguard 
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is silent on the 
means an attorney may employ to investigate charges 
of impropriety within the jury. Without a safeguard, 
the important policy of preventing post-trial 
harassment of jurors would go unprotected. 118 Many 
jurisdictions have local federal rules to address this 
omission. 119 
jury considered extraneous material which was not properly 
admitted into evidence." !d. 
114 See, e.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965). 
Il5 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
116 See Peter A. Kuperstein, Extraneous Information Prejudicial 
If It Influences Average Reasonable Juror's Decision - State v. 
Hartley, 656 A.2d 954 (R.l. 1995) 30 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 557, 
558-59 (1995). 
117 See also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (allowing 
juror testimony concerning bailiffs comments to the jury). 
liS See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. 
119 See Crump, supra note 96, at 525-28. 
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In Maryland, an attorney or party in a federal 
case may not question a juror without court 
permission. 120 The local rule serves two purposes. 
First, it prevents random harassment of jurors. By 
requiring attorneys to obtain the court's permission 
prior to questioning a juror, attorneys are prevented 
from seeking evidence of misconduct without 
reasonable suspicion. Second, the rule brings the 
court into the process at the start of the investigation. 
The court may set limits on tC 13 inquires. These 
guidelines prevent reasonable investigations from 
developing into harsh inquisitions. 
V. PROPOSAL TO COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND I21 
This section of the paper is a proposal to the 
Maryland Court of Appeals to redraft Rule 5-606(b), 
incorporating necessary changes for a clear and 
equitable approach to the admissibility of juror 
testimony for verdict impeachment purposes. 
A. New Rule 5-606(b) - Policy Considerations 
Addressed 
The proposed rule balances the justifications 
underlying existing Rule 5-606(b) with additional 
considerations that are required to secure justice in 
jury trials. 
1. Fairness and Accuracy in Verdicts 
A compromise must be reached between the goal 
of protecting the jury system and insuring that parties 
receive a fair and accurate verdict. Existing Maryland 
Rule 5-606(b) ignores the need for balance. The rule 
excludes "any matter or statement occurring during 
120 See U.S. DIST. CT. MD. R. 107.16. Rule 107.16 provides: 
Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, no attorney or party shall 
directly or through an agent interview or question any juror, 
alternate juror or prospective juror with respect to that juror's 
jury service. Id 
121 See The Proposed Rules. 
the course of deliberations."122 This inflexible barrier 
to juror testimony ignores the need for occasional 
investigations into the jury room. 123 The frequency of 
essential inquiries into the jury deliberation may be 
limited, but the courts require a means to investigate 
when a valid case for inquiry is presented. A Sixth 
Amendment challenge by a criminal defendant is an 
instance when a court must have the ability to hear 
from jurors. 124 
The two exceptions in Proposed Rule 5-606(b) 
offer Maryland courts vital windows into the jury 
room. By permitting limited juror testimony on 
external influences, a sound balance is struck. Jurors 
are prevented from testifying on the reasoning process 
employed during deliberations or the effect of 
anything on their minds. They are permitted to testify 
on the existence of external matters inconsistent with 
the search for justice. The compromise offers courts 
the ability to receive testimony and make 
determinations based on the merits of each case. 
2. Protecting the Jury from Post-Verdict 
Harassment 
Maryland cases dealing with the admissibility of 
juror testimony consistently cite the extreme 
harassment jurors would receive if they were 
permitted to testify about their verdicts. 125 Existing 
Md. Rule 5-606(b) fails to completely address this 
important policy objective. The present rule operates 
as a disincentive for attorneys to question jurors 
because the fruits of the inquiries will be inadmissible. 
This argument overestimates the legal reasoning 
power of the average litigant. Upon receipt of an 
unfavorable verdict, a losing party may search for an 
explanation of the verdict without considering the 
uselessness of any information uncovered. Absent a 
clear rule preventing this activity, disappointed 
litigants will continue to interrogate jurors. 
122 Supra note 12. 
123 See generally Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321, 125 
A. 782 (1924). 
124 See supra notes 107-10. 
125 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
Articles 
A disincentive approach can only work if it is 
focused on preventing specific behavior. Existing Md. 
Rule 5-606 only collaterally addresses the solicitation 
of jurors. Subtlety has no place in effective 
legislation. The goal of preventing juror harassment 
is extremely important and warrants more than an 
exclusionary rule. Proposed Rule X directly addresses 
the need to protect the jury by forbidding contact with 
jurors without leave of court. By placing the control 
in the hands of the trial judge, unfounded searches into 
the jury deliberations will be prevented. 126 
3. Public Opinion of the Legal System 
The argument has been advanced that permitting 
inquiry into the deliberation process will make private 
deliberations the focus of public inquiry.127 The 
reality in our society is that the deliberation process 
has already been made public. Jurors write books 
detailing the events of the deliberation process and 
appear on television programs explaining their 
impression of the evidence at trial. Excluding juror 
testimony to keep the deliberation process private is 
overlooking the fact that we live in an exposed society 
with a powerful, relentless media. When a trial 
attracts attention, the media will not be stopped from 
making the private search for truth available for public 
vIewmg. 
The Proposed Rules 
Maryland Rules 
Title 5 - Evidence 
Chapter 600 Witnesses 
Rule 5-606(b)128 
Inquiry into Validity of Verdict 
(1) Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a 
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations 
or to the effect of anything upon that or any other 
126 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
127 See Williams, 204 Md. at 67-68, 102 A.2d at 728. 
128 FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
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juror's mind or emotions as influencing the jurors to 
assent or dissent from the verdict or concerning the 
juror's mental processes in connection therewith, 
except that a juror may testify on the following 
questions: 
(A) whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to 
the jury's attention; 
(B) whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any 
Juror; 
(2) A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement 
the juror concerning a matter about which the juror 
would be precluded from testifying may not be 
received for these purposes. 
Maryland Rules 
of Civil and Criminal Procedure 
Rule X 
Contact With Jurors l29 
(1) After the jury has been discharged, neither 
attorney in the action or the parties shall contact a 
member of the jury regarding the verdict. 
(2) If any attorney believes in good faith that the 
verdict may be subject to legal challenge, the attorney 
may apply to the court for permission to interview 
members of the jury regarding any fact claimed to 
support the legal challenge. 
(3) If satisfied that good cause exists, the court may 
grant permission to the attorney to make the requested 
contact and shall prescribe the terms and conditions 
under which the contact shall be conducted. 
(4) If upon inquiry the court finds that a valid legal 
challenge to the verdict exists, the court may grant a 
hearing to review legal challenge and supporting 
evidence. 
(5) If an attorney in the action is contacted by a 
juror regarding the verdict, the attorney shall direct the 
juror to contact the court. An attorney shall not 
counselor contact the juror regarding the information 
to be delivered to the court. 
129 See Crump, supra note 96, u.s. DIST. CT. N.D. MISS. R. 
1(b)(4); U.S. DIST. CT. S.D. MISS. R. 1 (b)(4). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The policy justifications for excluding juror 
testimony to challenge a verdict are sound. The jury 
trial plays a vital role in our legal system and must be 
protected. Unchecked inquisitions, bribery or threats 
of violence, and an additional loss of public 
confidence in the legal system will result if courts 
begin to openly receive juror testimony. Maryland 
Rule 5-606(b) succeeds in preventing these dangerous 
results. However, the rule fails to acknowledge the 
importance of an accurate verdict based only on 
evidence offered at trial. An updated responsible rule 
is necessary to reach an equitable balance between 
fairness in litigation and the preservation of the jury 
system. Maryland Rule 5-606(b) should be amended 
to achieve this important objective. 
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